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Abstract
This paper examines firms’ investment-timing decisions in an oligopolistic set-up. Facing demand uncer-
tainty, firms decide whether to invest early or wait until uncertainty has been resolved. We show that the
precise form that investment commitment takes matters for the investment-timing outcomes that emerge.
When firms can commit immediately to the final investment level, investment leadership may occur and early
investment is referred to as being primarily “aggressive”. By contrast, the presence of a time lag between
when and how much firms invest yields symmetric investment-timing outcomes only; we argue that early
investment is mainly “defensive” in that case.
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1. Introduction
Almost all forms of investment have three features in common: investment decisions are made
under uncertainty, are at least partially irreversible and the timing of the investment is crucial.
On the one hand, there is a flexibility gain associated with delaying investment in the face of an
uncertain future.2 On the other hand, in oligopolistic industries there is also a potential benefit of
committing in advance to investment in order to affect the strategic environment in which future
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2 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a comprehensive discussion of the option value of delaying irreversible investment.
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competition takes place.3 This offsetting gain from commitment generates a trade-off between
investing early and delaying investment.
There is a small literature on the commitment-flexibility trade-off in output setting games.4
Maggi (1996) extends this literature to look at a model of strategic investment under uncertainty.
The main finding in his paper is that, in a duopoly setting with ex ante identical firms, one of
the firms commits to early investment and the other adopts a wait-and-see strategy and becomes
an investment follower. A key assumption in Maggi (1996) is that investment is immediately
in place; investing early then implies that firms select the capital level to which they are then
committed.5 Maggi’s result suggests that early investment commitment is primarily “aggressive”:
firms commit early to capture the benefits of investment leadership. There are several real-world
examples confirming this motive underlying early investment.6 However, empirical evidence from
case studies indicates that this does not always need to be the case. In a case study of the bulk
chemical industry, Ghemawat (1984) points out how the presence of significant construction
lags in the industry can allow “defensive” commitment: firms invest early to avoid being in the
strategically disadvantaged position of investment follower. He cites (p. 157) how one firm, Kerr-
McGee, prevented its rival, Du Pont, from obtaining a first-mover advantage: by introducing its
own investment plans before Du Pont’s expansion had fully materialised, Kerr-McGee forced
Du Pont to revise its initial capacity plans. In other words, while the construction process was
ongoing, the final capital level was not yet irrevocably fixed.7 In this example, it is the construction
lag in investment that prevents firms from sticking to their initial choice of capital. There are,
however, other types of investment that take place over time. One important example is R&D.
After starting an R&D project, a firm is still able to deviate (to some degree) from the initially
specified R&D expenditure level and indeed may wish to do so once its rivals’ investment plans
have been observed or leaked. In this paper, we investigate whether investment commitment with
gestation lags – such as those described above – also generates investment leadership by ex ante
symmetric firms (as it does when investment is immediately in place) or whether it leads to ex
post symmetric roles. In fact, we show that this modification of the assumption regarding the form
of investment commitment leads to equilibria in which firms adopt symmetric roles: either both
firms invest early or both adopt a wait-and-see approach.
We set-up a model of investment under oligopoly that combines the three key features of
investment: uncertainty, irreversibility and timing. We consider two different investment-timing
games. In the first game, investment is immediately in place; investing early implies that firms
select the investment level to which they are then committed. In the second game, firms first commit
3 As argued first by Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980), firms have an incentive to undertake actions that will improve their
future strategic position relative to their competitors. Tirole (1988) provides a textbook treatment of this issue.
4 Examples are Appelbaum and Lim (1985), Spencer and Brander (1992) and Sadanand and Sadanand (1996). Note
that the flexibility in timing discussed in these papers is quite different from the technological flexibility discussed in, for
instance, Vives (1989) and Boyer and Moreaux (1997). In those models there need not be a trade-off between flexibility
and strategic commitment.
5 This is, for instance, the case when a factory is bought rather than being built from scratch, or when a new technology
is adopted.
6 For instance, Sony gained an investment first-mover advantage over Philips when the latter decided to set-up a CD-plant
in the US only after Sony’s plant was fully operational (see McGahan, 1993).
7 Just as Rome was not built in a day, factories are not constructed overnight. Industries in which investment typically
are characterised by significant construction lags are, for instance, Aerospace and Pharmaceuticals (Pindyck, 1991).
Ghemawat (1984) reports that, for a typical plant in the titanium dioxide industry, there is a lag of at least 4 years between
the decision to construct and the actual start-up date.
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to the timing of their investment but cannot yet credibly set the actual capital level. After having
chosen when to invest, firms observe the timing decision made by their rival before finalising their
investment levels. This alternative two-step form of commitment is more appropriate to capture the
investment decision process when investment involves gestation lags. Adopting the terminology
for endogenous timing games introduced by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), the former game will
be referred to as the “action commitment” game and the latter will be labelled the “observable
delay” game.8
In Section 2, we discuss the set-up in which two rival firms choose capital and output for
a market characterised by demand uncertainty. In Section 3, the investment-timing pattern that
emerges with “action commitment” is compared to the investment timing with “observable delay”.
In Section 4 some welfare issues are addressed. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
This section outlines the basic model, which will be used to study strategic behaviour both in
the game in which firms can immediately commit to an investment level, the “action commitment”
(AC) game, and in the game in which they commit to the investment timing before they can fix
the investment level, the “observable delay” (OD) game. In order to put the subtle differences
between the two games in sharp relief, we first outline what is common to both games in Section
2.1 and then highlight the differences in Section 2.2.
2.1. Investment with demand uncertainty
Consider a Cournot duopoly in which firms produce identical products. Output of firm i is
denoted by qi (i = 1, 2). Firms face uncertainty about demand, captured by the following inverse
demand function:
p = a − Q + u (1)
with p denoting the market price and Q = q1 + q2 industry output; u∈ [u
-
, u¯] is the stochastic
demand component with zero mean and variance σ2.9
Firms invest in capital ki (i = 1, 2). Firm i’s total costs, TCi, are given by:
TCi = (c0 − ki)qi + k
2
i
2η
with TCiki = −qi +
ki
η
and TCiqi = c0 − ki (2)
The positive parameter η is inversely related to the cost of capital and c0 is a positive constant.
TCiki and TC
i
qi
are defined respectively as the marginal cost of capital and the marginal production
cost. Investing in capital reduces the marginal cost of production for firm i. We assume c0 > ki.
This cost function is commonly used in oligopoly models with strategic investment.10 It captures
8 Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) restrict attention to price and output games and do not look at investment decisions.
Furthermore, since they assume certainty, they are not concerned with the trade-off between commitment and flexibility.
9 These are the only restrictions on the probability distribution that are required. A straightforward – but by no means
the only − candidate is the uniform distribution.
10 See, for example, Grossman and Maggi (1998). We rule out the case in which c0 ≤ ki. In their strategic trade model,
Grossman and Maggi include c0 ≤ ki; the marginal cost curve then remains constant at c0 for levels of ki beyond c0. For
an in-depth exploration, we refer to their work.
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Fig. 1. (a) The action commitment game and (b) the observable delay game.
in a very simple way that a firm can choose to have lower marginal costs in exchange for higher
fixed costs. Profits of firm i are given by:
πi = pqi − TCi, i = 1, 2 (3)
In both games, there are two periods (see Fig. 1a and b). Firms face uncertainty about demand
in period 1, which disappears at the start of period 2. In our model a firm can commit to some
but not all of its factors of production long-term: firms can commit to capital, but not to output.
Outputs are always chosen simultaneously in period 2, that is, after uncertainty has been resolved.
A firm’s first-order condition for output is11:
A − 2qi − qj + ki + u = 0 (4)
with A a− c0 and i, j = 1, 2; i = j.
Hence, the equilibrium output for firm i is:
qi = 13 (A + 2ki − kj + u) (5)
Firms decide when to invest in period 1. For simplicity, we assume throughout that firms are risk
neutral. Hence, their investment-timing decisions follow from maximising expected profits. Firms
11 We restrict attention to interior solutions.
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either commit to their capital in the first period or postpone investment.12 When capital is chosen
in period 1, it is set before output. But, if chosen in period 2, it is determined simultaneously with
output. If a firm invests early, it determines its capital in period 1 by maximising expected profits
(maxkiEπi). On the one hand, commitment to capital in the first period enables firms to choose
capital strategically, allowing them to influence future outputs to their advantage. On the other
hand, by setting capital levels in period 1 (before uncertainty has been resolved), a firm reduces
its output flexibility compared to when it delays investment. When capital is chosen in period 2, it
will be set in line with actual demand (i.e., ki = ki(u) with (∂ki/∂u) > 0). This investment flexibility
in turn enhances the firm’s output flexibility. Hence, our model captures the stylised fact that,
in practice, investors who value flexibility have an incentive to delay investment when they face
significant uncertainty.13
2.2. Two forms of commitment
Firms face a trade-off between flexibility and commitment, both in the AC- and in the OD-
game. The AC-game is a two-stage game, illustrated in Fig. 1a. In stage 1 of the AC-game, firms
either choose capital levels or delay investment; with commitment, the timing of investment and
the choice of capital level are thus compressed into a single action. In stage 2, outputs are chosen
and firms that delayed investment set capital levels.
The nature of commitment with investment that is not immediately in place is different and is
more appropriately captured by the OD-game. This game consists of three stages (see Fig. 1b).
Firms first decide when to invest (stage 1), but because investment takes time, the actual level of
capital is not immediately fixed.14 Only in a later stage, after the timing decisions have been made
and observed by both parties, do firms fix their capital levels. So, a firm that chooses to commit and
thus invests early, sets its capital level after the investment-timing choices are made, but before
uncertainty has been resolved (stage 2). A firm that delayed investment, sets its capital level at the
same time it chooses output (stage 3).15 Although the distinction between the two games seems
quite subtle, we will show that it makes a considerable difference to the investment-timing pattern
that emerges. As argued in Section 1, in many cases this two-step form of investment commitment
– or, the OD-game – is a more accurate description of the investment process.
Note that, in Fig. 1a and b and throughout the text, superscripts ‘c’ and ‘d’ denote commitment
and delay, respectively. The first superscript on the variables refers to firm 1 and the second to
firm 2.
12 There exists a literature that addresses the issue of partial commitment to output in a multi-period set-up (see, for
instance, Pal (1996)). However, partial commitment is probably less realistic with capital commitment, since the costs of
adding capital to an existing level may be prohibitively high in the short run, due to the existence of indivisibilities and
incompatibility in technologies.
13 Despite being risk neutral, firms value flexibility. This follows from the fact that expected profit is increasing in the
variance of demand. The positive effect of the variance on ex ante expected profits is due to the fact that the actual ex post
realisation of profits is convex in u. Due to the indirect effect of capital on output, the positive effect of the variance on
expected profits is larger under investment flexibility than under commitment, implying that a rise in uncertainty increases
the value of investment delay. This feature is consistent with option value theory in finance. Note that risk aversion (which
complicates the analysis considerably) simply strengthens the gains from remaining flexible but yields no additional
insights.
14 Firms’ timing decisions, once made, are assumed too costly to be reversed.
15 In the OD-game delaying implies that the investing project can only be completed in period 2.
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Table 1
Capital levels for the different candidate equilibria under action commitment and observable delay
C1, C2 C1, D2 D1, C2 D1, D2
k1 kcc1 =
4
3
ηEqcc1 k
cd
1 =
2(2 − η)
3 − 2η ηEq
cd
1 k
dc
1 (u) = ηqdc1 (u) kdd1 (u) = ηqdd1 (u)
k2 kcc2 =
4
3
ηEqcc2 k
cd
2 (u) = ηqcd2 (u) kdc2 =
2(2 − η)
3 − 2η ηEq
dc
2 k
dd
2 (u) = ηqdd2 (u)
3. Investment timing
In each game, the equilibria that emerge depend on the level of uncertainty. However, at a
given level of uncertainty the two games may generate different outcomes. We proceed in two
steps. In Section 3.1, we discuss all the possible candidate equilibria of the two games.16 Then,
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we will show how the actual equilibrium investment-timing pattern in
each game depends on the precise form of commitment.
3.1. Candidate timing equilibria
In both games, there obviously are four possible timing combinations: (C1, C2), (C1, D2), (D1,
C2) and (D1, D2), where Ci and Di (with i = 1, 2) refer to commitment and delay, respectively. It
follows directly that these combinations are the only candidate timing equilibria under OD. Under
AC, there is also a candidate equilibrium corresponding to each of the four possible investment-
timing combinations. Again, (C1, C2), (C1, D2), (D1, C2) and (D1, D2) are the only possible
equilibria, but “commitment” (C) now refers to the immediate choice of a particular capital level
(k).17
3.1.1. Equilibrium capital levels
The capital levels for each of the candidate equilibria under AC are the same as those at the
corresponding equilibria under OD and are reported in Table 1.18 In (C1, C2) and (D1, D2),
firms choose their capital simultaneously; firms’ capital levels per unit output are symmetric, but
larger for investment commitment than for delay (i.e., (kcci /Eqcci ) > (kddi (u)/qddi (u))). Commit-
ment allows a firm to credibly increase its capital level, reducing marginal costs (see Eq. (2))
and in turn pushing its output reaction function to the right. As a result, it increases its market
share, while the rival produces less and has lower profits. In the terminology of Fudenberg and
Tirole (1984), firms that commit to investment adopt a “top-dog” business strategy. Furthermore,
capital levels are strategic substitutes. Hence, a firm that sets its capital level prior to its rival, has
an additional incentive to invest more, thus reducing both the capital and the output level of its
rival. In candidate equilibria (C1, D2) and (D1, C2), only one firm invests early and hence leads
in investment. The committed capital level per unit output chosen by the leader is larger than that
chosen by either firm when both firms commit ((kcd1 /Eqcd1 ) = (kdc2 /Eqdc2 ) > (kcci /Eqcci )).
16 We consider only pure strategies.
17 For convenience and where it will not cause confusion, we will use C to represent commitment under AC even though
commitment then always refers to a capital level.
18 Expected profits in each candidate equilibrium are given in Table A.1.
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Fig. 2. Capital reaction functions and candidate equilibria.
3.1.2. The trade-off between commitment and flexibility in the AC- and OD-games
We now compare the sustainability of the different investment-timing combinations under AC
and OD. This is the key to understanding the differences between the two games. Fig. 2 proves
helpful in explaining these differences intuitively. For the remainder of this section and without
loss of generality, we will adopt the perspective of firm 1.
Fig. 2 shows firm 1’s capital reaction function when it commits, denoted by rc1(k2), and the
expected capital reaction function when it delays, Erd1(k2). To avoid overburdening the diagram,
firm 2’s capital reaction function is drawn for commitment only and denoted in Fig. 2 by rc2(k1).
A committed firm’s capital reaction function, rci (kj), traces its first-period best response to capital
levels of a committed rival; a delaying firm’s (expected second-period) capital reaction function,
Erdi (kj), traces its (expected) best response to capital levels of a committed or a delaying rival.
These reaction functions are the same under AC and under OD. Note that the rc1(k2)-reaction
function is to the right of Erd1(k2), reflecting the more aggressive choice of capital under commit-
ment. The candidate equilibrium with investment leadership by firm 2 occurs at point A, while
the candidate equilibrium in which both firms commit occurs at point B, the intersection of rc1(k2)
and rc2(k1) (the remaining two candidate equilibria are not illustrated). The level of uncertainty
together with the type of commitment (AC or OD) will determine the actual equilibrium outcomes.
Comparing the sustainability of the candidate equilibria under AC and OD, we first consider
(C1, C2). In both games, as uncertainty rises, the value of flexibility increases and this equilib-
rium eventually breaks down as players wish to deviate from commitment to delay given rival
commitment. We define the critical uncertainty threshold above which firm 1 prefers delay to
commitment and hence above which (C1, C2) breaks down under AC as σ2m (see Table 2). At
σ2m, we have Eπ1(D1, kcc2 ) = Eπ1(C1, kcc2 ).19 The corresponding threshold under OD is defined
19 Here, C1 refers to a particular capital level, k1 = rc1(kcc2 ) (see Footnote 17).
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Table 2
The uncertainty thresholds under action commitment and observable delaya
Threshold Definition Applies in
σ2x Eπ1(D1, C2) = Eπ1(C1, C2) OD
σ2
h
Eπ1(D1, D2) = Eπ1(C1, D2) AC, OD
σ2m Eπ1(D1, kcc2 ) = Eπ1(C1, kcc2 ) AC
σ2
l
Eπ1(D1, kdc2 ) = Eπ1(C1, kdc2 ) AC
a These are always ranked as follows: σ2x > σ2h > σ
2
m > σ
2
l
.
as σ2x at which Eπ1(D1, C2) = Eπ1(C1, C2). It requires a higher level of uncertainty for (C1, C2)
to break down under OD than under AC, i.e., σ2x > σ2m. We explain the intuition for this with
the aid of Fig. 2. Under AC, firm 2 has committed to capital level kcc2 in (C1, C2). Taking kcc2 as
given, a deviation by firm 1 from commitment to delay is represented by a jump from points B to
B′. In contrast, under OD at (C1, C2), if firm 1 were to deviate from commitment, it would take
account of the fact that, in stage 2, its rival (having observed that firm 1 delays) would adjust to
a higher capital level (kdc2 instead of kcc2 ). In Fig. 2, this deviation is represented by a movement
from points B to A. As firm 1’s expected profits are lower at A than at B′, deviating from the (C1,
C2)-equilibrium is less attractive under OD than under AC; hence, σ2x > σ2m.
Continuing our approach of adopting the perspective of firm 1, next consider the candidate
equilibrium (D1, C2) (point A in Fig. 2), in which firm 1 is the investment follower. Under AC,
with firm 2 committed to kdc2 , the uncertainty threshold below which (D1, C2) breaks down will
be referred to as σ2l , at which Eπ1(D1, kdc2 ) = Eπ1(C1, kdc2 ).20 Under OD, (D1, C2) breaks down
below σ2x . There exists a range of uncertainty levels for which the investment follower is happy
to delay under AC, but would want to deviate to commitment under OD, i.e., σ2x > σ2l . Fig. 2 is
again used to explain the intuition. In AC, if firm 1 were to deviate from delay to commitment, it
could not affect the rival’s high capital level kdc2 . In the figure, such a deviation corresponds to a
movement from points A to A′. By contrast, a deviation by firm 1 from delay to commitment in
OD would force the committed rival firm to adjust its capital downward to a less aggressive level,
kcc2 (shown by a movement from A to B). Firm 1’s expected profit is lower at A′ than at B. So,
under OD the investment follower’s incentive to deviate from delay to commitment is stronger
than under AC.
Next, consider the candidate equilibrium (C1, D2), in which firm 1 is the investment leader.
When uncertainty becomes sufficiently high, firm 1 eventually wishes to deviate to delay. Impor-
tantly, both in the AC- and the OD-game, if firm 1 were to deviate from commitment, it would take
account of the fact that its rival would observe this delay and would choose a higher capital level
in period 2 (kdd2 instead of kcd2 ). Hence, this equilibrium breaks down when uncertainty exceeds
the same threshold level under OD and AC. We define this threshold as σ2h, at which Eπ1(D1,
D2) = Eπ1(C1, D2).
Finally, consider (D1, D2) (this is not shown in Fig. 2) under AC and OD. In both games, this
equilibrium eventually breaks down as uncertainty falls, inducing players to deviate from delay
to commitment given rival delay. Under both OD and AC, this equilibrium breaks down when
uncertainty falls below σ2h, which also forms the upper bound for the (C1, D2)-equilibrium.
20 Here, C1 refers to the capital level k1 = rc1(kdc2 ) (see Footnote 17).
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The definitions of the uncertainty thresholds in Table 2 will be useful in the next two sections,
in which we derive the actual equilibria that emerge in each game.
3.2. Solving the AC-game
In this section we solve the benchmark AC-game, which captures the case in which the invest-
ment level is immediately in place (see Fig. 1a). In stage 1, each firm chooses either ki, ki ∈R+,
if it commits, or the discrete action D, if it delays.
Ex ante symmetry allows us to look at the problem from the perspective of firm 1 without loss
of generality. If firm 2 commits, its only actions that can form part of an equilibrium are kcc2 and
kdc2 . As discussed in the previous section, the uncertainty threshold above which firm 1 delays if
firm 2 commits to kcc2 is σ2m. If firm 2 commits to kdc2 , the threshold above which firm 1 delays is
σ2l . If the rival firm delays, firm 1 will delay rather than commit above σ2h. We show in Appendix B
that 0 < σ2l < σ2m < σ2h. To understand the intuition for this ranking of thresholds, first note that,
ceteris paribus, the benefit of commitment to a firm increases in the gap between the price and its
marginal production cost.21 However, the price-cost margin enjoyed by a firm is itself negatively
related to the output level of its rival. Thus, higher k2-values are associated with higher q2-values
and a reduced price-cost margin for firm 1, which in turn weakens the incentive for firm 1 to
commit. Hence, the lower the capital level of firm 2, the higher the level of uncertainty at which
firm 1 prefers commitment to delay. Next, note that kdc2 > kcc2 and that both these capital levels
are larger than the expected capital levels of firm 2 when it delays. This explains the ranking of
the thresholds. Given this ranking, the equilibrium outcomes at different uncertainty levels can
be established. These are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The equilibria in the AC-game depend on the level of uncertainty:
(i) For σ2 < σ2l , both firms commit; (C1, C2) is the unique equilibrium.
(ii) For σ2l ≤ σ2 ≤ σ2m, both firms commit, or, one firm commits and the other delays; (C1, C2),
(C1, D2) and (D1, C2) are the equilibria.
(iii) For σ2m < σ2 < σ2h, one firm commits and the other delays; (C1, D2) and (D1, C2) are the
equilibria.
(iv) For σ2 = σ2h, one firm commits and the other delays, or, both firms delay; (C1, D2), (D1, C2)
and (D1, D2) are the equilibria.
(v) For σ2 > σ2h, both firms delay; (D1, D2) is the unique equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Fig. 3 illustrates the outcomes of the AC-game. It depicts the uncertainty thresholds as functions
of η. As shown in the figure, the ranking of the thresholds is independent of the value for η. The
uncertainty thresholds demarcate different regions. Areas I, III and V are the main regions (region
II is merely a narrow boundary22 between I and III, while IV represents a knife-edge between III
and V). In areas I and V, firms invest at the same time, while investment leadership prevails in
21 Compared to delay, commitment implies a larger capital and hence output level, and the value of a higher output level
increases in the per-unit operating profit.
22 For instance, at η = 0.15, region II is only 0.00060 wide in terms of σ2, while this distance narrows down even further
to a σ2-range of 0.00005 at η = 0.05.
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Fig. 3. Investment timing with action commitment.
area III. The occurrence of investment leadership is a key feature of the AC-game, to which we
will return in Section 3.4.
Note that, for σ2l ≤ σ2 ≤ σ2h, there are multiple pure-strategy equilibria. For instance, for
σ2m < σ
2 < σ2h, there are two leadership equilibria (that are the mirror image of each other).23
With equilibrium multiplicity, Pareto dominance is sometimes applied to select an equilibrium.
But here, since both firms prefer leading to following, this equilibrium selection method will not
solve the question of which firm will be assigned with the leadership role. There is, however, also
a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each firm chooses the probability with which
it will commit. The equilibrium probability – which is the same for each firm – is low at high
levels of uncertainty and high at low values of σ2. Naturally, the actual timing outcome remains
the result of a randomisation over the pure strategies C and D. To avoid the paper becoming too
taxonomical, we do not analyse mixed-strategy equilibria in detail.
3.3. Solving the OD-game
In this subsection we solve the OD-game, which captures a two-step form of investment
commitment (see Fig. 1b). Now, because firms observe each other’s investment timing before
determining their actual capital level, the nature of commitment is less “sticky” than with the quick-
in-place investment in the AC-game. This feature has important implications for the outcomes of
the game.
Again, because of ex ante symmetry we need only examine the problem from the perspective
of firm 1. If firm 2 delays, firm 1 prefers to commit below σ2h, the same threshold as in the
23 Such leadership equilibria also occur in the continuous-time model of technology adoption by Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985) (for an extension of that model to a set-up with uncertainty, see Huisman and Kort (1999)).
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Fig. 4. Investment timing with observable delay.
AC-game. However, if firm 2 commits, firm 1’s behaviour under OD differs from that under AC.
A firm that contemplates deviation from (C1, C2) must take account of the fact that its rival will
react aggressively by setting a higher capital level (under AC a firm that contemplates deviation
from (C1, C2) takes kcc2 as fixed). For this reason, as explained in detail in Section 3.1, (C1, C2)
is easier to sustain as an equilibrium under OD than under AC. As a result, the threshold level
of uncertainty below which firm 1 commits given rival commitment is higher in the OD-game
than the corresponding thresholds in the AC-game (σ2x > σ2m > σ2l ).24 It is now even above the
threshold given rival delay, i.e., σ2x > σ2h (see Appendix B). The outcomes for different ranges of
uncertainty are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The equilibria in the OD-game depend on the level of uncertainty:
(i) For σ2 < σ2h, both firms commit; (C1, C2) is the unique equilibrium.
(ii) For σ2h ≤ σ2 ≤ σ2x , both firms commit, or, both firms delay; (C1, C2) and (D1, D2) are the
equlibria.
(iii) For σ2 > σ2x , both firms delay; (D1, D2) is the unique equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Fig. 4 depicts investment timing in the OD-game. As in the AC-game, the ranking of the σ2-
thresholds is independent of η. In area I, both firms invest early, whereas both delay investment
24 Unlike with AC, commitment (C) now simply means “investing early” and is therefore a discrete action. Hence, there
just is a single threshold at which firm 1 is indifferent given rival commitment. Given that firm 2 chooses to commit but
can only fix its capital level in stage 2, firm 1 will compare its expected profits from also committing, Eπ1(C1, C2), to
those from delaying investment, Eπ1(D1, C2), knowing that its investment-timing choice will affect the optimal level of
firm 2’s capital in stage 2 (kcc2 if C1 and kdc2 if D1).
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Table 3
Investment timing under action commitment and observable delay
AC-game OD-game
σ2 > σ2x (D1, D2) (D1, D2)
σ2
h
< σ2 < σ2x (D1, D2) (C1, C2); (D1, D2)
σ2m < σ
2 < σ2
h
(C1, D2); (D1, C2) (C1, C2)
σ2
l
< σ2 < σ2m (C1, C2); (C1, D2); (D1, C2) (C1, C2)
σ2 < σ2
l
(C1, C2) (C1, C2)
in area III. At intermediate levels of uncertainty (area II) a firm only invests early if its rival does
so as well.
Note that, like in the AC-game, there is a range of uncertainty (σ2h ≤ σ2 ≤ σ2x ) in which multiple
equilibria occur. However, unlike in the AC-game, there is now a Pareto dominant equilibrium,
(D1, D2), which is the “natural focal point” in this range of uncertainty.25
3.4. Aggressive and defensive motive for investment commitment
Table 3 gives a synoptic overview of the investment-timing patterns in AC and OD for dif-
ferent bands of uncertainty. A clear difference in outcomes of the AC- and the OD-game is that
leader–follower equilibria occur in the former, but never exist in the latter (see Propositions 1
and 2). To understand this difference, it is helpful to define formally the “aggressive motive” and
the “defensive motive” for commitment. We will say that the motive for commitment is “aggres-
sive”, if it is optimal to commit given delay by the rival. In both games the aggressive motive for
commitment holds for uncertainty levels up to the σ2h-threshold. The motive for commitment is
called “defensive”, if the firm chooses to commit given commitment by the rival. The uncertainty
range over which the defensive motive for commitment exists is different in each game. In the
OD-game, defensive commitment continues to hold at higher levels of uncertainty (i.e., up to
σ2x > σ
2
h) than aggressive commitment does.26 This is not true in the AC-game, in which the
defensive motive for commitment is much weaker. In fact, defensive commitment ceases to occur
at much lower uncertainty levels than the maximum uncertainty threshold for aggressive commit-
ment. This suggests that under OD firms tend to commit more for defensive than for aggressive
reasons, that is, more to avoid ending up as the follower than to gain a first-mover advantage.
Under AC, the opposite is true: the relative strength of the aggressive commitment motive gives
rise to investment leadership equilibria.
A related difference between the outcomes in the two games is formally stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Under observable delay (C1, C2) continues to be an equilibrium at higher levels
of uncertainty than under action commitment.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
25 As pointed out by a referee, in an infinitely repeated version of this game – and of the AC-game – a tacit collusion
equilibrium, characterised by delay by both firms and sustained by punishment strategies, is likely to emerge.
26 In the OD-game, the motive for commitment is both aggressive and defensive for σ2 < σ2
h
(thus, commitment is a
dominant strategy in that range of uncertainty).
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In other words, with OD, both firms will, at relatively high levels of uncertainty, invest early,
whereas this is not the case with AC. With OD, unlike under AC, a firm may still want to commit
at relatively high levels of uncertainty provided that its rival does so too, whereas it would delay
if its rival decides to delay investment. Hence, the relative strength of the defensive commitment
motive explains the symmetry in investment-timing outcomes in the OD-game.
3.5. Profits
For low enough levels of uncertainty (σ2 < σ2h), the expected profit ranking in both games is
given by Eπcd1 > Eπdd1 > Eπcc1 > Eπdc1 for firm 1 (and, similarly, by Eπdc2 > Eπdd2 > Eπcc2 >
Eπcd2 for firm 2). However, as the level of uncertainty increases, the ranking changes since the
relative benefits of investment delay become larger: Eπdd1 > Eπcd1 and Eπdd2 > Eπdc2 for σ2 > σ2h,
and Eπdc1 > Eπcc1 and Eπcd2 > Eπcc2 for σ2 > σ2x .
So, are firms better off under AC or under OD? The answer depends on the level of uncertainty
that prevails. When the investment-timing outcome with AC is the same as the one with OD
(i.e., for σ2 < σ2l and for σ2 > σ2x ), firms’ profits are also the same. At intermediate levels of
uncertainty (σ2l < σ2 < σ2h), a firm is better off under AC than under OD provided that it emerges
as the investment leader (Eπcd1 > Eπcc1 ), but is worse off if it ends up being the follower in
investment (Eπdc1 < Eπcc1 ). At relatively high levels of uncertainty (σ2h < σ2 < σ2x ), (D1, D2) is
guaranteed only in the AC-game, while it is merely one of two possible outcomes in the OD-game.
Hence, since both firms prefer (D1, D2) to (C1, C2), firms will be at least as well off under AC as
under OD in this range of uncertainty.
4. Welfare
We now ask which of the four investment-timing equilibria is preferred from a social perspec-
tive. We then examine whether these outcomes differ from those generated by the market in the
AC- and in the OD-game. Define expected welfare (EW) as the expected sum of consumer surplus
(CS) and industry profits:
EW = E(CS + π1 + π2) (6)
with CS = Q2/2. We have already discussed the commitment-flexibility trade-off from the firm’s
perspective. From a social perspective, there also exists a trade-off between commitment and delay.
Commitment leads firms to strategically overinvest. The capital–output ratio under commitment
exceeds the cost-minimising level (obtained by TCiki = 0), which is (from expression (2)) given
by:
ki
qi
= η (7)
Although raising the social costs of investment, commitment has positive implications for con-
sumers: higher investment leads to a higher industry output and hence to a lower price, thus
increasing expected consumer surplus. However, consumers also benefit from flexibility, which
is greatest when both firms delay27 and which becomes more important as uncertainty rises.
27 This follows from the fact that, like profit, consumer surplus is convex in u.
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Fig. 5. (a) Market outcomes versus socially preferred outcomes with action commitment. (b) Market outcomes versus
socially preferred outcomes with observable delay.
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In Fig. 5a and b, the actual investment-timing outcomes are indicated by superscript ‘m’, while
the socially preferred outcomes are superscripted by ‘s’ (σ2w is defined as the uncertainty threshold
at which EW(C1, C2) = EW(D1, D2)).28 A shaded label highlights the areas in which the market
outcome differs from the socially preferred investment timing. Under AC (Fig. 5a), the market
produces too much commitment in area III (and possibly in area IV), but too little commitment in
area IIB (and in the leadership equilibria in area IIA). In contrast, under OD (Fig. 5b), the market
will never produce too little but may generate too much commitment.
This brief positive welfare analysis indicates which investment-timing equilibrium yields the
highest welfare for different ranges of uncertainty and allows us to compare these with those
generated by the market. However, it is clear that policy intervention could improve welfare since
the oligopoly distortion implies that firms are producing too little. In addition, when firms are
investing strategically, their capital exceeds the socially efficient level. The standard instruments
to deal with these distortions are production subsidies to raise output and capital taxes to reduce
the capital-output ratio. However, a package of policies including production subsidies and capital
taxes may not be sufficient to reach the first-best. With the first two distortions dealt with, the first-
best also requires flexibility at all levels of uncertainty. When uncertainty is high enough, policies
to guarantee flexibility will not be needed as firms will have an incentive to maintain flexibility
themselves. But, at lower levels of uncertainty the government would need an instrument to ensure
flexibility.29 There will be a greater range of σ2 over which the government will need to adopt
“commitment deterrence” policies when firms can observe each other’s investment timing before
fixing investment levels.30
5. Conclusion
Standard investment theory finds that an increase in uncertainty causes delay. However, under
oligopoly with quantity-setting firms, there are also incentives to invest early. This paper analysed
investment-timing decisions in an oligopolistic set-up in which firms decide whether to invest early
or wait until uncertainty has been resolved. An important finding in the existing literature is that
ex ante symmetric firms will end up adopting asymmetric roles ex post: one firm assumes the role
of investment leader and the other follows in investment. We re-examined this result and showed
that the investment leadership outcome is sensitive to the form that investment commitment takes.
The assumption that firms can commit immediately to a specific capital level when they invest
early, proves to be crucial for investment leadership to arise. We contrasted a game in which firms
commit in one step to an investment level with an alternative game in which investment timing is
observed before the investment level is finalised. The latter set-up is consistent with the stylised
fact that there is a gestation lag associated with most investment projects. We found that, with
this small – but, in our view, realistic – modification in the nature of investment commitment,
outcomes are symmetric with either both firms investing early or both adopting a wait-and-see
28 This is the only relevant threshold from a social perspective, since either (C1, C2) or (D1, D2) will be socially preferred
to (C1, D2) and (D1, C2).
29 Although expected welfare rises in σ2, it would be quite inappropriate to draw policy conclusions from this. What
matters for the purpose of this paper is that the coefficient of σ2 is larger when firms are flexible than when they have
committed to their investment at an early stage. This is the case in our model, even under the simplifying assumption of
risk neutrality. An assessment of policies that influence uncertainty would, however, require modelling agents’ attitudes
to risk and stretches beyond the scope of this paper.
30 Commitment deterrence policies are discussed (in an open-economy setting) in Dewit and Leahy (2004).
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approach. Crucially, in this case investment leadership no longer emerges as an equilibrium. In
addition to contrasting investment-timing outcomes, profits and welfare in the two games were
also compared.
We explained that the reason why a subtle change in the assumptions regarding the form of
commitment has this effect on outcomes lies in differences in the defensive incentive to commit in
the two cases. When firms observe the timing of investment before finalising their capital levels,
they have a greater defensive incentive to commit. Case studies such as Ghemawat’s analysis of
the bulk chemical industry (cited in Section 1) demonstrate that defensive commitment, facilitated
by investment gestation lags, is far more than just a theoretical possibility.
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Appendix A. Expected profits in the candidate equilibria
For expected profits in the candidate equilibria under action commitment and observable delay,
see Table A.1.
Table A.1
Expected profits in the candidate equilibria under action commitment and observable delaya
C1, C2 C1, D2 D1, C2 D1, D2
Eπ1 γ[Eqcc1 ]2 +
1
9
σ2 ζ[Eqcd1 ]
2 +
( 1 − η
3 − 2η
)2
σ2 ϕ[Eqdc1 ]
2 + 1 − η/2(3 − 2η)2 σ
2 ϕ[Eqdd1 ]
2 + 1 − η/2(3 − η)2 σ
2
Eπ2 γ[Eqcc2 ]2 +
1
9
σ2 ϕ[Eqcd2 ]
2 + 1 − η/2(3 − 2η)2 σ
2 ζ[Eqdc2 ]
2 +
( 1 − η
3 − 2η
)2
σ2 ϕ[Eqdd2 ]
2 + 1 − η/2(3 − η)2 σ
2
a Eqcci ≡ Eqi(kcc1 , kcc2 ), Eqcdi ≡ Eqi(kcd1 , kcd2 ), Eqdci ≡ Eqi(kdc1 , kdc2 ), Eqddi ≡ Eqi(kdd1 , kdd2 ), γ ≡ 1 − (8/9)η,
ζ ≡ 1 − 2η((2 − η)/(3 − 2η))2 and ϕ≡ 1 − η/2.
Appendix B. Derivation of the crucial uncertainty thresholds
Because firms are symmetric, we need only derive the crucial uncertainty thresholds for firm
1. Each threshold is defined as the level of uncertainty, σ2k (with k = l, m, h, x), at which firm 1 is
indifferent between commitment and delay, given firm 2’s strategy choice (see Table 2).
(i) Under action commitment
Under AC, firm 2 has three possible first-stage actions that can be part of a candidate
equilibrium: D2, kcc2 and kdc2 . If firm 2 chooses D2, the threshold at which firm 1 is indifferent
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between commitment and delay is given by σ2h. From the definition of σ2h and using the
relevant expressions for Eπ1 in Table A.1, we obtain:
ϕ[Eqdd1 ]
2 + 1 − η/2(3 − η)2 σ
2
h = ζ[Eqcd1 ]
2 +
(
1 − η
3 − 2η
)2
σ2h
Rearranging terms then yields:
σ2h =
ζ[Eqcd1 ]
2 − ϕ[Eqdd1 ]
2
1−η/2
(3−η)2 −
(
1−η
3−2η
)2 (B.1)
If firm 2 chooses kcc2 , the uncertainty threshold at which firm 1 is indifferent between com-
mitment and delay is given by σ2m. From the definition of σ2m, using the relevant expressions
for Eπ1 in Table A.1 and with
Eπ1(D1, kcc2 ) = ϕ[Eq1(Erd1(kcc2 ), kcc2 )]
2 + 1 − η/2(3 − 2η)2 σ
2
we obtain (after some rearranging of terms):
σ2m =
γ[Eqcc1 ]2 − ϕ[Eq1(Erd1(kcc2 ), kcc2 )]
2
1−η/2
(3−2η)2 −
1
9
(B.2)
If firm 2 chooses kdc2 , the uncertainty threshold at which firm 1 is indifferent between
commitment and delay is given by σ2l . From the definition of σ2l , using the relevant
expressions for Eπ1 in Table A.1 and with Eπ1(C1, kdc2 ) = γ[Eq1(rc1(kdc2 ), kdc2 )]
2 + (1/9)σ2,
we obtain:
σ2l =
γ[Eq1(rc1(kdc2 ), kdc2 )]
2 − ϕ[Eqdc1 ]
2
1−η/2
(3−2η)2 −
1
9
(B.3)
From expression (5) and using the expressions given in Table 1 in (B.1)–(B.3), we obtain
0 < σ2l < σ2m < σ2h.
(ii) Under observable delay
Under OD, firm 2 has two possible timing choices: D2 and C2. If firm 2 chooses D2,
the threshold at which firm 1 is indifferent between commitment and delay is σ2h, which is
given by (B.1). If firm 2 chooses C2, the uncertainty threshold at which firm 1 is indifferent
between commitment and delay is given by σ2x . From the definition of σ2x and using the
relevant expressions in Table A.1, we obtain:
σ2x =
γ[Eqcc1 ]2 − ϕ[Eqdc1 ]
2
1−η/2
(3−2η)2 −
1
9
(B.4)
From expression (5) and using the expressions of Table 1 in (B.1) and (B.4), we obtain
σ2h < σ
2
x .
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Appendix C. Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. For each candidate equilibrium, we determine the uncertainty range
over which it actually is an equilibrium. Without loss of generality (as firms are symmetric), we
take the perspective of firm 1.
(a) The candidate equilibrium (C1, C2):
This is an equilibrium at σ2 = 0, when there are no flexibility advantages of delaying and
both firms commit, regardless of the timing choice of their rival. For σ2 ≤ σ2m, given kcc2 firm
1 will not wish to deviate from kcc1 (by symmetry, firm 2 will not want to deviate from kcc2
in that region). Thus, (C1, C2) will be an equilibrium for σ2 ≤ σ2m. When σ2 > σ2m, (C1, C2)
cannot be an equilibrium since we have Eπ1(C1, kcc2 ) < Eπ1(D1, kcc2 ), implying that firm 1
wants to delay.
(b) The candidate equilibrium (D1, D2):
For σ2 < σ2h, Eπ1(D1, D2) < Eπ1(C1, D2), implying that (D1, D2) cannot be an equilibrium.
For σ2 ≥ σ2h, Eπ1(D1, D2) ≥Eπ1(C1, D2), implying that firm 1 does not wish to deviate from
delay and hence (D1, D2) is an equilibrium.
(c) The candidate equilibria (C1, D2) and (D1, C2):
Threshold σ2h also demarcates the maximum uncertainty upper limit for the leader–follower
equilibria, (C1, D2) and (D1, C2). In other words, (C1, D2) (and by symmetry (D1, C2)) cannot
be an equilibrium when σ2 > σ2h, since then Eπ1(C1, D2) < Eπ1(D1, D2). The lowest of the
thresholds, σ2l , provides the lower bound for leader–follower equilibria. When σ2 < σ2l , we
have Eπ1(C1, kdc2 ) > Eπ1(D1, kdc2 ), and hence firm 1 will wish to deviate from delay given
that firm 2 commits to the investment leadership capital level, kdc2 .
Given σ2h > σ2m > σ2l > 0, Proposition 1 (i)–(v) follow from (a)–(c). 
Proof of Proposition 2. The investment-timing equilibria under OD are determined by a method
similar to the one described in Proof of Proposition 1, but now using the thresholds σ2x and σ2h,
with σ2x > σ2h > 0.
(a) The candidate equilibria (D1, D2) and (C1, C2):
Since σ2x > σ2h, when σ2 > σ2x each firm will play delay, regardless of its rival’s timing
choice. Hence, (D1, D2) is the unique equilibrium when σ2 > σ2x . For σ2 < σ2h, commitment
will be played by each firm, regardless of its rival’s timing choice. Hence, (C1, C2) is the
unique equilibrium for σ2 < σ2h. At σ2h ≤ σ2 ≤ σ2x , commitment is the best response to rival
commitment, while delay is the best response to rival delay. Therefore, both (D1, D2) and
(C1, C2) are equilibria for σ2h ≤ σ2 ≤ σ2x .
(b) The candidate equilibria (C1, D2) and (D1, C2):
When commitment is an optimal response to delay (σ2 ≤ σ2h), delay is not an optimal
response to commitment, and, when delay is an optimal response to commitment (σ2 ≥ σ2x ),
commitment is not an optimal response to delay. Hence, (C1, D2) and (D1, C2) are never
equilibria. 
Proof of Proposition 3. From part (a) of Proof of Proposition 2, it follows that with OD (C1,
C2) is an equilibrium for σ2 ≤ σ2x . From part (a) of Proof of Proposition 1, it follows that with AC
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(C1, C2) is an equilibrium for σ2 ≤ σ2m. Since σ2m < σ2x (from Appendix B), Proposition 3 must
be true. 
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